

Message Text

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ORIGIN EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ADP-00 MBFR-03 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09

H-02 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01

SS-15 USIA-12 OMB-01 GAC-01 MC-02 ACDA-19 /128 R

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APPROVED BY EUR: WJSTOESSEL, JR.

EUR/ WE: RDVINE

EUR/ SOV: JSROY

D/ MBFR: VBAKER

EUR: ESSPRINGSTEEN

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R 210041 Z APR 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY ROME

INFO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USLO SACLANT

USNMR SHAPE

XMT USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY ROME

S E C R E T STATE 075342

E. O.11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: STOESSEL- DUCCI CONVERSATION: MBFR AND CSCE

1. IN CALL ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY STOESSEL, ITALIAN
FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO DUCCI STATED
THAT HE WISHED TO DISCUSS MBFR AND CSCE AND ASKED SPE-
CIFICALLY WHETHER THE US STILL ENVISAGED REDUCTIONS
TAKING PLACE IN BOTH STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS FORCES.

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2. STOESSEL RESPONDED THAT A PAPER SETTING FORTH US APPROACH TO MBFR WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE NAC BY THE END OF THIS MONTH, AND THAT OUR EMPHASIS IS ON STATIONED FORCES.

3. DUCCI NOTED THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED TO DISCUSS MBFR IN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF THE EC NINE. HE COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE FRENCH HAD AGREED TO DISCUSS MBFR. ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD DOUBTLESS CONTINUE THEIR POLEMICS AGAINST MBFR IN THE EC NINE CONTEXT, THE FRENCH WERE NO LONGER STANDING ALOOF AND, WITH THEIR TWO DIVISIONS IN GERMANY, IT WAS USEFUL TO HAVE THEM IN. STOESSEL AGREED, BUT SAID WE HOPED THAT THE NINE WOULD LEAVE THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALLIED POSITIONS TO THE NAC. DUCCI AGREED, SAYING THAT IN THE EC NINE IT WAS THEIR INTENTION TO DISCUSS

WHAT HARM CERTAIN MBFR MODELS MIGHT DO TO WESTERN EUROPE, BUT THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POSITIONS SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE LEFT TO THE COUNCIL. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE ITALIANS AGREED FULLY WITH THE EMPHASIS GIVEN TO STATIONED FORCES. HE THEN ASKED WHETHER WE CONTINUED TO VIEW THE REDUCTION AREA AS BEING CONFINED TO CENTRAL EUROPE, AND WHETHER OR NOT WE HAD CONSIDERED A CONSTRAINTS AREA WIDER THAN THAT OF THE REDUCTION AREA?

4. STOESSEL SAID THAT WE CONTINUED TO VIEW THE REDUCTION AREA AS BEING CONFINED TO CENTRAL EUROPE. WITH RESPECT TO CONSTRAINTS, STOESSEL SAID CERTAINLY WE WERE INTERESTED IN CONSTRAINTS AND PHASING, BUT THAT ONE CANNOT NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS SOLELY ON CONSTRAINTS; IT WOULD BE NECESSARY ALSO TO IDENTIFY AND DISCUSS APPROACHES TO REDUCTIONS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE DRAWN OUT, BUT THERE IS THE PROBLEM THAT UNLESS WE ARE ADDRESSING REDUCTIONS, CONGRESS MIGHT LOSE ITS PATIENCE.

5. DUCCI WONDERED IF THE GERMAN VERSION OF A PHASED AND INTEGRAL PROGRAM WAS NOT UNREALISTIC IN THAT IT WOULD STRETCH OUT NEGOTIATIONS FOR SEVERAL YEARS. STOESSEL
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AGREED THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WAS PROBABLY UNREALISTIC.

HE ALSO SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CONCLUDE THE PRESENT MULTILATERAL INITIAL TALKS IN VIENNA. HE EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR CAREFUL CONSULTATIONS IN NATO ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLIED APPROACH TOWARD MBFR, BUT INDICATED THAT NATO SHOULD LEAVE ROOM FOR FLEXIBILITY DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

6. DUCCI SAID THAT ONCE THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION WAS SETTLED IN VIENNA, TWO THINGS WOULD REMAIN -- THE AGENDA AND THE DATE. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD INSIST ON INDIGENOUS FORCES BEING ON THE AGENDA. STOESSEL REPLIED THAT EFFORTS BY THE ALLIES TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS ON THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THE AGENDA ITEM MIGHT BE VERY GENERAL, SUCH AS "FORCES TO BE REDUCED". DUCCI COMMENTED THAT HE FELT THE EARLY ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DATE IN LATE SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER FOR NEGOTIATIONS WAS ESSENTIAL SINCE THIS MIGHT REMOVE SOME OF THE PRESSURE IN HELSINKI FOR MORE RAPID PROGRESS IN THE MPT. SOME PEOPLE, HE SAID, EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT THE SOVIETS MAY HOPE THAT THE US WILL APPLY PRESSURE TO ITS ALLIES TO MOVE MORE RAPIDLY IN HELSINKI IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY DELAY ON MBFR. ONCE THE SOVIETS AGREED TO AN MBFR DATE HOWEVER, THIS OPPORTUNITY FOR PRESSURE WOULD DISAPPEAR. DUCCI AGREED THAT WE SHOULD NEGOTIATE WITHOUT DELAY IN

HELSINKI, BUT NOT UNDER DURESS, THAT IS NOT AGAINST ANY AGREED DATE FOR THE FIRST FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING. HE FELT SURE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE GOING TO PRESSURE THE US AND OTHERS TO TRY TO SPEED UP THE MPT.

7. STOESSEL SAID HE AGREED WITH DUCCI -- THAT WE WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF LATE JUNE FOR THE FIRST FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, BUT WE SHOULD NOT RUSH INTO BAD AGREEMENTS. HE FELT, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS A GOOD PROSPECT OF MEETING THE LATE JUNE DATE IN HELSINKI. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE IN FACT COMPLAINED TO US THAT THE PACE IN HELSINKI WAS TOO SLOW, BUT WE MADE THE POINT THAT THE SOVIET ATTITUDE ON HUMAN CONTACTS WAS VERY NEGATIVE AND DISAPPOINTING, AND UNLESS THEY CHANGED THIS POSITION, THEY WILL BE IN TROUBLE IN HELSINKI.

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8. DUCCI ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS ON THE SITE FOR THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE CSCE, NOTING THAT THEY ARE VERY SKEPTICAL ABOUT A "PERMANENT ORGAN" AND WOULD BE VERY OPPOSED TO SEEING IT IN HELSINKI. HE NOTED THAT IF THE COMMISSION

PHASE OF THE CSCE WERE IN HELSINKI, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO BREAK THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE STEERING COMMITTEE AND THE PERMANENT ORGAN, AND THERE WOULD THUS BE A STRONG PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF THE PERMANENT ORGAN BEING IN HELSINKI, WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD FAVOR. THE PROBLEM, OF COURSE, WAS TO FIND A PLACE WHERE THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE MIGHT BE HELD. HE WONDERED IF IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE SOME OVERLAP IN THE SAME CITY; FOR EXAMPLE, VIENNA, BETWEEN THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE AND MBFR. WHILE HE REALIZED THERE WAS OPPOSITION TO HAVING CSCE AND MBFR TAKE PLACE IN THE SAME CAPITAL, SUCH A MOVE MIGHT REMOVE SOME OF THE FEELINGS OF DISTRUST ABOUT MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. STOESSEL SAID THAT IT WAS PROBABLE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD RESIST HAVING THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SAME CITY, BUT THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING WE COULD DISCUSS INNATO. PORTER

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